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RACE AND DEATH SENTENCING IN NORTH
CAROLINA, 1980-2007*
MICHAEL L. RADELET & GLENN L. PIERCE
For the past several years the North Carolina General Assembly
has been interested in the question of whether there are racial
disparities in the administration of the death penalty in the state.
As researchers who have studied this issue in several states over
the past three decades, we designed a study to determine if
patterns of death sentencing in North Carolina are correlated
with the race of the victim and/or the race of the defendant
among homicides with similar levels ofaggra vation.
After reviewing past research that has examined this issue, we
gathered data on approximately 15,000 North Carolina
homicides, from 1980 to 2007, of which 352 cases resulted in
death sentences. We only included data on cases where the
defendant and victih were either Black or White. In addition to
the race variables, we gathered information that allowed us to
ascertain the impact of two "Additional Legally Relevant
Factors" in death sentencing: the number of victims in the
homicide event and the number of contemporaneous felonies
that occurred at the time of the homicide.
We found that both the race of the suspect and the race of the
victin are associated with death sentencing, although the effect of
the suspect's race disappears when we statistically control for the
other variables in the analysis. Those who kill Whites are more
likely to be sentenced to death than those who kill Bla cks among
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cases where no Additional Legally Relevant Factors were
present, among cases with one Additional Legally Relevant
Factor present, and among cases with two Additional Legally
Relevant Factors present. Thus, it is implausible to argue that the
reason why those who kill Whites are sentenced to death more
frequently than those who kill Blacks is because the former cases
are "worse" or more aggravated.
Our final analysis enters all the relevant variables into a
predictive equation. The data lead to the conclusion that overall,
for homicides in North Carolina from 1980 to 2007, the odds of a
death sentence for those suspected of killing Whites are
approximately three times higher than the odds of a death
sentence for those suspected ofkilling Blacks.
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INTRODUCTION
Concerns about the possibility of conscious or unconscious racial
bias in the application of the death penalty in North Carolina have a
very long history. In 1987, those voicing such concerns suffered a
significant defeat when the Supreme Court ruled that absent evidence
RACE AND DEA TH SENTENCING
of intentional discrimination, statistical evidence of racial disparities
in death penalty cases could not be used to prove a constitutional
violation.) Although the Court explicitly invited legislatures to
address the issue of race in application of the death penalty,2 it would
be several years before enabling legislation was finally enacted.
A federal bill, commonly referred to as the "Racial Justice Act,"
was first introduced into Congress in 1988.' The bill would have
allowed defendants to use statistical evidence as proof of
discrimination in an individual case.4 It failed to pass either house,
and a revised version, introduced in 1994, failed to pass the Senate.'
In 1998, Kentucky became the first state to pass a Racial Justice Act.'
The second Racial Justice Act was passed in North Carolina in 2009.'
North Carolina's Racial Justice Act allows the use of statistical
evidence in claims that race was a significant factor in decisions to
1. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987).
2. Id. at 319 ("McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies.").
3. In response to McCleskey, the first Racial Justice Act was introduced into the
House of Representatives by Congressman John Conyers in 1988. Racial Justice Act of
1988, H.R. 4442, 100th Cong. (1988). Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a similar bill
into the Senate the following year. Racial Justice Act of 1989, S. 1696, 101st Cong. (1989).
4. See H.R. 4442 § 3(a); see also S. 1696 § 3(a) (proposing to add a new chapter to
title 28 of the United States Code that would allow capital defendants in federal and state
cases to use "ordinary methods of statistical proof' to demonstrate a prohibited "racially
discriminatory pattern" regarding imposition of the death penalty).
5. The proposed 1994 Racial Justice Act, like the 1988 and 1989 versions offered in
the House and Senate, would have allowed death row inmates to use statistical evidence to
demonstrate racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty. Racial Justice
Act, H.R. 4017, 103d Cong. (1994). For an account of the events surrounding the 1994
attempt to pass a federal Racial Justice Act, see David C. Baldus, George Woodworth &
Catherine M. Grosso, Race and Proportionality Since McCleskey v. Kemp (1987):
Different Actors with Mixed Strategies ofDenial and Avoidance, 39 COLU M. HU M. RTs. L.
REV. 143, 146 n.12 (2007); Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in
Administering the Death Penalty: The Need for the Raciallustice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 519, 529-30 (1995).
6. Kentucky Racial Justice Act, ch. 252, 1998 Ky. Acts 941, 941-42 (codified at KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.300 -. 309 (West 2011)). For additional background information
on the Kentucky Racial Justice Act, see generally Gennaro F. Vito, The Raciallustice Act
in Kentucky, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 273 (2010) (discussing the Kentucky Racial Justice Act in
detail). Legislators in other states have tried unsuccessfully to pass similar legislation.
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Part II: Report to the ALI Concerning Capital
Punishment, 89 TEX. L. REV. 367, 400 (2010) ("Many state legislatures have considered
similar legislation (including Georgia, Illinois, and North Carolina), but to date only
Kentucky has enacted such a provision.").
7. North Carolina Racial Justice Act, ch. 464, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 1,213 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010 to -2012 (2009)); Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The
Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North
Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2111-25 (2010). The full text of the Act is reprinted in
Kotch & Mosteller, supra, at 2,129-31.
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seek (prosecutorial behavior) or impose (jury behavior) the death
penalty.' The Act entitles defendants under death sentences to
present evidence that (1) "[d]eath sentences were sought or imposed
significantly more frequently upon persons of one race than upon
persons of another race," (2) death sentences were sought or imposed
more frequently for offenses against persons of one race than for
offenses against persons of another race, or (3) that "[r]ace was a
significant factor in decisions to exercise peremptory challenges
during jury selection."' If the defendant prevails, the death sentence is
vacated, and he or she is resentenced to a penalty of life
imprisonment without parole."o The Act was retroactive, allowing
virtually all North Carolina inmates under a sentence of death who
believed they had a meritorious claim to raise it, provided they did so
before August 11, 2010 (one year after the bill officially became
law)." In the end, some 152 death row inmates-95% of those on
North Carolina's death row-filed for relief under the Racial Justice
Act.12 At the time of this writing, these cases are pending in courts
throughout the state.13
As researchers with a longstanding interest in studying racial
disparities in death sentencing, 4 we decided to undertake a study that
would shed light on possible racial inequities in the imposition of
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010 (2009) ("No person shall be subject to or given a
sentence of death or shall be executed pursuant to any judgment that was sought or
obtained on the basis of race." (emphasis added)).
9. § 15A-2011(b).
10. § 15A-2012(a)(3).
11. § 2, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1,215 (authorizing defendants under a sentence of
death on the date of the passage of the Act, August 11, 2009, to file a motion for
appropriate relief "within one year of the effective date of this act").
12. Nathan Koppel, Death Penalty Goes on Trial in North Carolina, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 2010, at A6. The large number of death row inmates who filed claims can be
explained by the breadth of the statute. For example, even defendants who do not have
claims based on discrimination of race of the defendant or victim may have viable claims
that the state discriminated in jury selection. See § 15A-2012(a)(3) (providing racial
discrimination can be established if the defendant can show that "[r]ace was a significant
factor in decisions to exercise peremptory challenges during jury selection").
13. In February 2011, a superior court judge in Forsyth County heard the first legal
arguments in the State on the Racial Justice Act. See Michael Hewlett, Racial Justice Act
Upheld, WINSTON-SALEM J., Feb. 11, 2011, at Al. Judge William Z. Wood ruled that the
law was constitutional and rejected arguments by prosecutors that the Racial Justice Act
was "too vague and broad and subject to multiple interpretations." Id.
14. Our first publications on this topic were William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce,
Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME &
DELINQ. 563 (1980); Michael L. Radelet, Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the
Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REV. 918 (1981). We began collaborating some twenty-five
years ago. See Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in
Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 587 (1985).
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North Carolina death sentences. In this Article we report the results
of that project. We examine data on 15,281 homicides in North
Carolina that occurred between January 1, 1980 and December 31,
2007, of which 368 resulted in death sentences for the convicted
perpetrators. Our goal is to discover what role, if any, the race of the
suspect and victim plays, controlling for legally relevant factors, in
explaining who is sentenced to death. The existing research leads us
to construct a hypothesis postulating that the race of the victim is
associated with the current application of the death penalty in North
Carolina.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I provides a historical
overview of the administration of the death penalty in North Carolina
and a review of empirical studies that have examined possible racial
disparities in the administration of the death penalty in the state. In
Part II, we describe how we gathered the data utilized in the present
study, including data on all homicides in the state from 1980 through
2007, data on death penalty cases during that time span, measures of
the defendant's and victim's races, year of the homicide, number of
victims, and whether the homicide involved contemporaneous
felonies. Part III summarizes the findings from our analyses. After
entering all the data into predictive equations, we show that once
legally relevant factors (number of victims and additional felony
circumstances) are statistically controlled, the race of the victim, but
not the race of the suspect, is associated with the decision to impose
death sentences in the twenty-eight years studied, 1980 through 2007.
Finally, in our Conclusion we discuss what the data do and do not tell
us, how they compare with the findings of other similar studies, and
implications of this study for policy-makers.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS STUDIES
A. Historical Perspective on the Administration of the Death Penalty
in North Carolina
There are few states in the United States, if any, that have
attracted as much attention over the years from death penalty
scholars as North Carolina." In part this may be because of the
15. See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 35 (1989); BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH
A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 90 (1987); Harold Garfinkel,
Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27 SOC. FORCES 369, 369 (1949);
Elmer H. Johnson, Selective Forces in Capital Punishment, 36 Soc. FORCES 165, 165
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historical breadth of the North Carolina criminal code. As Hugo
Adam Bedau observed:
As late as 1837, North Carolina required death for all the
following crimes: murder, rape, statutory rape, arson,
castration, burglary, highway robbery, stealing bank notes,
slave-stealing, "the crime against nature" (buggery, sodomy,
bestiality), duelling if death ensues, burning a public building,
assault with intent to kill, breaking out of jail if under a capital
indictment, concealing a slave with intent to free him, taking a
free Negro or mulatto out of the state with intent to sell him
into slavery; the second offense of forgery, mayhem, inciting
slaves to insurrection, or of circulating seditious literature
among slaves; being an accessory to murder, robbery, burglary,
arson, or mayhem. Highway robbery and bigamy, both capitally
punishable, were also clergyable. This harsh code persisted so
long in North Carolina partly because the state had no
penitentiary and thus had no suitable alternative to the death
penalty.16
In part because of these broad statutes, North Carolina hosted
some 784 known executions between August 26, 1726, the earliest
recorded execution in North Carolina, and October 27, 1961. This
number ranks fifth among states behind Virginia, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Georgia." The races of those executed were' 9:
(1957); ISAAC UNAH & JOHN CHARLES BOGER, RACE, POLITICS, AND THE PROCESS OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 2 (2009), availableathttp://www.ncids.org
/Motions% 20Bank/RacialJustice/Unah-Boger% 20Study.pdf.
16. Hugo Adam Bedau, GeneralIntroduction, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA:
AN ANTHOLOGY 1, 6-7 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., rev. ed. 1967). By "clergyable,"
Professor Bedau means that the offenses were eligible for "benefit of clergy," wherein
members of the clergy (and later, laypeople as well) could have death sentences reduced
to less severe sanctions. Id. at 4 n.6.
17. Executions is [sic] the U.S. 1608-2002, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, 189-210,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ESPYstate.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2011)
[hereinafter Executions in the U.S.]. For a list of those executed from 1910 to present, see
Persons Executed in North Carolina, N.C. DEP'T OF CORR., http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop
/deathpenalty/personsexecuted.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
18. See Executions in the United States, 1608-1976, By State, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-united-states-1608-1976-state (last
visited Aug. 22, 2011).
19. These data were obtained from Executions in the U.S., supra note 17, at 189-210.
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Table 1: North Carolina Number ofPersons Executed, 1726 to 1961,
by Race
The data do not show any executions of Hispanic defendants. The
crimes for which these 784 executions were carried out were2 1:











11 1nipld Murd 00Q1
Poisoning 1 0.001
Unknown 85
20. This excludes the twenty cases where the defendant's race is unknown, and thus
uses a denominator of 764.
21. Executions in the U.S, supra note 17, at 189-210.
22. This excludes the eighty-five cases where the type of crime is unknown, and thus
the denominator is 699. Id.
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By the early 1970s, the death penalty statute in North Carolina
allowed executions for murder, rape, burglary, arson, and carnal
knowledge of a child aged twelve or younger.23 The death penalty was
mandatory for a murder caused by train wrecking.24
After October 1961 there were no more executions until March
1984.25 Since then another forty-two men and one woman have been
executed in the state, four of whom dropped their appeals and
volunteered for execution.26 Two were asphyxiated, while the other
forty-one died from lethal injections. 2 7 At the time of this writing in
August 2011, there had not been any executions in the state since
August 2006.28
23. Hugo Adam Bedau, Offenses Punishable by Death, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 39, 50 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., rev. ed. 1967). For an
excellent overview of the North Carolina death penalty statute from 1946 through 1968,
including data on the number of executions and life sentences, see Clarence H. Patrick,
Capital Punishment and Life Imprisonment in North Carolina, 1946 to 1968. Implications
for Abolition of the Death Penalty, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REV. 417, 423
(1970). Because a decline in the number of executions did not increase first degree murder
rates, the author advocated the abolition of capital punishment in the state. Id. at 427.
24. Bedau, supra note 23, at 50.
25. See Persons Executed in North Carolina, supra note 17. In 1972 the Supreme
Court concluded that the application of unguided discretion by juries in the administration
of the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in the cases under review violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). The
Supreme Court struck down North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute three years
later. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding that the then-current
mandatory death penalty statute in North Carolina violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments). North Carolina passed a revised death penalty statute in 1974, Act of Apr.
8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 1, 1974 N.C. Sess. Laws 323, 323 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17
(2009)), and in 1984 the first North Carolina death row prisoner was executed under this
statute. Executions Carried Out Under Current Death Penalty Statute, N.C. DEP'T OF
CORR., http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/deathpenalty/executed.htm (last visited Aug. 22,
2011).
26. These figures are current as of May 4, 2011. Executions Carried Out Under
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The races of the forty-three inmates executed since 1984 and the
races of their victims are2 9:
Table 3: Races of Those Executed in North Carolina Since 1984 and
Races of Their Victims
Black Whte6 .140)
Native American Native American 1 0.023
Thus, 79.1% of those executed in North Carolina between 1984
and mid-2011 were convicted of killing Whites. Table A-i 3 2 shows
that between 2000 and 2009, the proportion of homicide victims who
were White ranged from 0.469 (in 2001) to 0.389 (in 2009), and,
overall, only 43.2% of homicides in North Carolina victimized
Whites. Because these figures come from two different (although
overlapping) time periods, any comparisons are only approximate,
but the data suggest that in recent years White victims are present in
less than half of all homicides, but nearly in 80% of the cases resulting
in execution in the state.
Tables A-1 and A-2 present data on the races of homicide
offenders and victims statewide, from 2000 to 2009. Statewide, the
United States Census Bureau estimated that the 2010 population of
North Carolina was 68.5% White, 21.5% Black, and 8.4% Hispanic.
29. Id.
30. Id. Throughout this Article, we use the classifications of race provided by the
different data owners and collectors.
31. Elias Hanna Syriani, convicted of killing his wife, was executed on November 18,
2005. Syriani was born in Jerusalem (Palestine) and later became a member of the
Jordanian Army. For a short biographical sketch of Elias Syriani, see Biff Hollingsworth
& Tim West, Elias Syriani Biography, FACING CONTROVERSY: STRUGGLING WITH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA (2008), http://www.lib.unc.edu/mss/exhibits
/penalty/syriani.html.
32. Table numbers preceded by the letter "A" are available in the Appendix. The
Appendix contains the statistical results of this study of the administration of the death
penalty. These results are discussed in further detail in Part III, infra.
33. See State & County QuickFacts, North Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2011). "The
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The data show that compared to the representation in the state's
population as a whole, Blacks are disproportionately identified as
homicide suspects (21.6% of the population and 62% of homicide
suspects),34 and Blacks are also more likely to be victims of homicide
(21.6% of the population and 52.9% of the homicide victims). 3 5
In May 2011 there were 154 men and four women under death
sentences in North Carolina,3 6 together making up the sixth largest
death row population in the United States." The racial backgrounds
of the 158 condemned prisoners are:
Table 4: Racial Composition ofNorth Carolina Death Row
Black ~84 0.532
Native American 18 0.051_______________
As of mid-July 2011, 196 inmates who had been sentenced to
death since 1977 had been removed from death row by trial or
appellate courts (mainly because of serious flaws in the original trial),
through executive clemency, or by passing away from causes other
than execution.
In 2009 there were 482 homicides recorded in North Carolina, a
20% drop from 2008.40 The proportion of homicides that result in the
concept of race as used by the Census Bureau reflects self-identification by people
according to the race or races with which they most closely identify." State & County
QuickFacts, Race, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/meta/long
RH1625209.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
34. See infra Table A-2.
35. See infra Table A-1.
36. See Offenders on Death Row, N.C. DEP'T OF CORR., http://www.doc.state.nc.us
/dop/deathpenalty/deathrow.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
37. Death Row U.S.A., NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., 32 33 (Fall 2010),
http://naacpldforg/files/publications/DRUSA Fall 2010.pdf. North Carolina's rank is
current as of October 1, 2010. Id. at 1.
38. See Offenders on Death Row, supra note 36. The North Carolina Department of
Corrections does not provide information on how the races of inmates are determined, but
it is likely that in almost all cases the race is self-disclosed by the inmate.
39. See Persons Removed from Death Row, N.C. DEP'T OF CORR., http://www.doc
.state.nc.us/dop/deathpenalty/removed.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
40. Crime in North Carolina-2009, N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2 (July 2010),
http://crimereporting.ncdoj.gov/public/2009/A SR/2009%/2OAnnual% 20Summary.pdf. The
482 murders in 2009 was the lowest total recorded in the preceding ten years. Id. at 8.
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arrest of a suspect is considerably higher than in the United States as
a whole. Whereas just over 60% of homicides in the United States are
solved,4 1 the clearance rate in North Carolina is remarkably higher.
Table 5 presents data on the number of homicides and clearances for
the ten-year period from 2000 to 2009.
Table 5: Total Murder Offenses and Clearances, North Carolina4 2
2000 563 420 74.6
2002 548 442 80.7
2004 522 391 74.9
200(7 606) 444 733
2000 48 4,205 86.1
41. Homicide Trends in the U.S., U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj
.gov/content/homicide/cleared.cfmn (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
42. See 2009 Annual Summary Report, 2009 Crime Statistics in Detailed Reports,
Murder, Murder Offenses and Clearances, Ten Year Trend, N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://
crimereporting.ncdoj.gov/ (click "View Crime Statistics" hyperlink; then click "Submit"
next to year 2009; then follow "Murder" hyperlink under "Index Offenses-Analysis"
subheading; then follow "Murder Offenses and Clearances, Ten Year Trend" hyperlink)
(last visited Aug. 22, 2011). For annual North Carolina crime statistics published by the
North Carolina Department of Justice, see Crime in North Carolina, N.C. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, http://crimereporting.ncdoj.gov/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
2011] 2129
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We now turn our attention to scholarly studies that have
examined the role of race in death sentencing in North Carolina.
B. Pre-Furman4 3 Studies
Data on slave executions in North Carolina were included in one
of the earliest data sets that allowed for the analysis of the role of race
in death sentencing decisions." Prior to the Revolutionary War, all
colonies except those in New England provided compensation for slave
owners if a slave was executed or given severe corporal punishment.4 5
This policy allowed the slave owners to avoid the choice between either
punishing the slave or protecting their capital investment in the cost of
the slave. The North Carolina slave code of 1715 "provided
compensation to owners for executed slave criminals, for slaves who
died as a result of corporal punishment ordered by a court, for outlaws
or runaways killed when apprehended, and for slaves killed in the act of
committing a crime."46 In fact, during some periods this compensation
was higher than the cost of replacing the slave.47 Compensation ensured
that the slave owners would not be financially harmed when their slaves
were executed and eliminated the financial incentives that may have
pressured authorities to convert death sentences to lesser punishments.
43. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court, in effect, invalidated all existing death
penalty statutes. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam)
(holding that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in the cases under
review violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). The first post-Furman death
penalty statute, and thus the oldest death penalty statute in effect today, was enacted in
Florida in 1972. Charles W. Ehrhardt & L. Harold Levinson, Florida's Legislative
Response to Furman: An Exercise in Futility?, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 10
(1973). At the time of Furman, there were 120 inmates on death row in North Carolina, all
of whom were resentenced to prison terms. See History of Capital Punishment in North
Carolina, N.C. DEP'T OF CORR., http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/deathpenalty/DPhistory
.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
44. Marvin L. Kay & Lorin Lee Cary, "The Planters Suffer Little or Nothing": North
Carolina Compensations for Executed Slaves, 1748-1772, 40 SCI. & SOC'Y 288, 288 (1976)
(describing the workings of the North Carolina system for compensating slave owners if
their slaves were executed). For information on slave courts, see generally Ernest James
Clark, Jr., Aspects of the North Carolina Slave Code, 1715-1860, 39 N.C. HIST. REV. 148
(1962) (arguing that during the eighteenth and nineteenth century in North Carolina there
was a general trend to extend to slaves the same procedural privileges afforded to Whites);
Alan D. Watson, North Carolina Slave Courts, 1715-1785, 60 N.C. HIST. REV. 24 (1983)
(describing eighteenth-century procedures dealing with alleged criminality by slaves).
45. Kay & Cary, supra note 44, at 289.
46. Id. at 292.
47. Id. at 296 ("[B]etween 1748 and 1758 compensations were considerably higher
than were market prices for slaves.").
[Vol. 892130
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Charles Phillips examined data on 48 lynchings and 104 legal
executions in North Carolina from 1889 to 1918.48 He found that
lynchings and executions complemented each other, serving similar
social functions.49 Substitution of executions for lynchings occurred only
after Blacks were disenfranchised in 1900.so Phillips argued that once
Blacks were disenfranchised, there was less need for overt repression in
the form of lynching."
In a second study, Phillips examined 217 executions that occurred
in 261 counties in North Carolina and Georgia in the eleven-year span
from 1925 through 1935.52 For each county he created a variable
measuring the difference between the Black execution rate (number of
executions of Blacks per 1,000 Black population) and the White
execution rate (number of executions of Whites per 1,000 White
population). Race differences in execution rates were related to the
county's urbanization and minority presence.54 However, after limiting
the analysis to only those counties where the execution rates for Blacks
exceeded the execution rates for Whites, he found that the biggest
differences in the rates of execution for Blacks compared to Whites
were in the counties with the lowest Black population." He suggested
the differences may be explained by the emotion and visibility of
executions as they "may be hazardous to use on a large but fairly
quiescent population." 6
In a seminal investigation of the significance of the race of the
offender and race of the victim in the severity of punishment, Harold
Garfinkel examined death certificates and court data related to 821
homicide offenders and 673 homicides from ten North Carolina
counties over an eleven-year period from 1930 to 1940." Ninety
percent of the homicides were intra-racial." While no additional
48. Charles David Phillips, Exploring Relations Among Forms ofSocial Control: The
Lynching and Execution of Blacks in North Carolina, 1889-1918, 21 LAw & SOC'Y REV.
361, 368 (1987).
49. Id. at 364-67.
50. Id. at 368.
5 1. Id.
52. See Charles David Phillips, Social Structure and Social Control: Modeling the
Discriminatory Execution of Blacks in Georgia and North Carolina, 1925-35, 65 Soc.
FORCES 458, 467 (1986).
53. Id. at 465.
54. Id. at 469.
55. Id. at 470.
56. Id. at 473.
57. Garfinkel, supra note 15, at 369. Garfinkel's data came from death certificates
filed in ten North Carolina counties. Id.
58. Id. at 370.
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characteristics of the crime were measured, Garfinkel's data showed
that Black defendants who killed White victims were treated more
harshly than other homicide cases at all stages of the criminal justice
process, from indictment through conviction to sentence.59
Similarly, Elmer Johnson studied the records of 660 death row
inmates in North Carolina between 1909, when the State took over
responsibility for executions from local governments, and 1954.60 While
he did not introduce any control variables that measured the "severity"
of the capital offenses, he reported execution rates by race and type of
crime, finding that only 24% of the burglars who were sentenced to
death were ultimately executed, compared to 55.6% of rapists and
56.3% of convicted murderers.6 1 Overall, 42.9% of the Whites
sentenced to death were executed, compared to 57.9% of the Blacks.6 2
The execution rate for those convicted of rape was highest for those
with White victims. 63 Finally, Johnson concluded that social class was an
important determinant of who was executed, finding that "capital
punishment appears to be directed largely at the economically and
socially underprivileged," as measured by educational attainment and
occupational status.64 Executive clemency was granted in 229 cases, so it
was not unusual for those on death row to be resentenced to prison
terms. 65
C. Post-Furman Legal Scholarship
The Furman decision, in effect, invalidated all existing death
penalty statutes in the United States. 66 In April 1974, the North
Carolina legislature reacted to the Furman decision by passing a
mandatory death penalty law in an attempt to remove disparities in
59. Id. at 371, 374. For example, those most likely to be charged with first degree
murder and sentenced to death were Blacks with White victims, followed by Whites with
White victims and then Blacks with Black victims. Id.
60. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 165-66.
61. Id. at 166.
62. These figures are computed from the data presented by Johnson. Id. at 169.
63. Id. at 166.
64. Id. at 167.
65. Id. at 166. Unfortunately, Johnson did not report the numbers of commutations by
the race of the defendant.
66. For an excellent overview of the background and content of this decision, see
generally MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973) (describing the history of Supreme Court battles over the
constitutionality of capital punishment).
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death sentencing."7 That death penalty statute was invalidated by the
Supreme Court in 1976.68
In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling, in 1977 North Carolina
passed a revised death penalty statute.69 in an early analysis, Joel Craig
explained the development and content of the statute, reviewed the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and discussed how appellate
courts initially interpreted them."o In an analysis that focused on
proportionality review, Carolyn Sievers Reed explained the process of
proportionality review and how the present procedures emerged.
James Exum, at the time an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina and former head of a committee established by the
American Bar Association to study the costs of the death penalty, wrote
a similar article that reviewed how the death penalty functioned in
North Carolina.72 A foe of the death penalty,73 Justice Exum took the
67. Act of Apr. 8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 1, 1974 N.C. Sess. Laws 323, 323 (current version
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2009)). This statute specified that all those convicted
of first degree murder "shall be punished with death." Id.
68. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding that the then-
current mandatory death penalty statute in North Carolina violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments). The Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing violated
the Eighth Amendment in three ways. First, it violated the evolving standards of decency
imposed by the Eighth Amendment because mandatory capital sentencing had been
rejected by American juries and legislators for years. Id. at 298. Second, by failing to give
juries any guidelines, mandatory capital sentencing increased the risk that juries would act
lawlessly. Id. at 303. Finally, mandatory sentencing failed "to allow the particularized
consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant
before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death." Id. For a more in-depth analysis
of this and related decisions, see generally Michael D. Rhoades, Resurrection of Capital
Punishment: The 1976 Death Penalty Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 543 (1977); L.S. Tao, The
Constitutional Status of Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Gregg, Jurek, Roberts, and
Woodson, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 345 (1977) (discussing several death penalty decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court in 1976).
69. This statute, with slight revisions, is still in force today. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000 (2009).
70. See generally Joel M. Craig, Comment, CapitalPunishment in North Carolina: The
1977 Death Penalty Statute and the North Carolina Supreme Court, 59 N.C. L. REV. 911
(1981) (explaining the development and content of the present North Carolina death penalty
statute, including the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and how appellate courts have
interpreted them to date).
71. See generally Carolyn Sievers Reed, Note, The Evolution of North Carolina's
Comparative Proportionality Review in Capital Cases, 63 N.C. L. REV. 1146 (1985)
(explaining how proportionality review emerged in North Carolina).
72. See generally James G. Exum, Jr., The Death Penalty in North Carolina, 8
CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (1985) (explaining how the death penalty works in North Carolina
pursuant to the death penalty statute which provided for a bifurcated proceeding in capital
cases).
73. See Interview with Alumnus/Alumna of the Month, The Honorable James G.
Exum, Jr. ('60), NYU Law, http://www.law.nyu.edu/alumni/almo/pastalmos
/20032004almos/jamesrexumjrapril/index.htm#interview (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
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position that the North Carolina statute did not suffer from any glaring
constitutional defects.74 On the other hand, Geoffrey Mangum
examined how the Supreme Court of North Carolina interpreted and
applied the provisions of the state's death penalty law in the immediate
aftermath of its passage." He argued that the aggravating circumstances
in the statute were too broad and vague to be uniformly applied.76
D. Post-Furman Race Studies
Barry Nakell and Kenneth Hardy published the first study to
empirically examine the possible effects of race on death penalty
decisions in North Carolina in the modern era." They studied the
disposition of homicides involving 661 victims and 611 defendants" in
North Carolina that occurred in the twelve months following June 1,
1977.7' Despite the small number of cases, the authors found that the
race of the victim exerted a statistically significant effect in
distinguishing which cases resulted in a conviction for first degree
murder: "All other factors being equal, including the quality of the
evidence and the seriousness of the offense, defendants in cases with
white victims were six times more likely to be found guilty of first
degree murder than defendants in cases with nonwhite victims."o
Second, in the 1980s, Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro included
North Carolina in their extensive analysis of death sentencing patterns
in eight states: Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Oklahoma, North Carolina,
Mississippi, Virginia, and Arkansas." While the patterns showed slight
variations between the states, the victim's race was associated with
death sentencing in all eight states." For their North Carolina analysis,
they compared FBI records of all homicides in the state from June 1977
74. See Exum, supra note 72, at 6 (stating that the author was "satisfied" that North
Carolina's statute was constitutional).
75. Geoffrey Carlyle Mangum, Comment, Vague and Overlapping Guidelines: A
Study ofNorth Carolina's Capital Sentencing Statute, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 765, 765-
66 (1980).
76. Id. at 818.
77. NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 15, at 93-97 (explaining the design and scope of
the empirical study of North Carolina death penalty decisions).
78. Id. at 93. Of these defendants, nine were sentenced to death. Id. In fact, "[tihere
were only 18 first degree murder convictions during the study year, too small for any kind
of further evaluation by statistical method." Id. at 97.
79. Id. at 93.
80. Id. at 146-48.
81. GROSS & MAURO, supra note 15, at 35.
82. In Georgia, Florida, and Illinois, "the race of the victim had a sizeable and
statistically significant effect on the odds of a defendant receiving a death sentence." Id. at
65. The data from the remaining five states "show a remarkably consistent pattern of
racial disparities." Id. at 89.
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to December 31, 1980, to the circumstances accompanying murder
convictions for those sentenced to death.13 They divided homicides into
two categories: (1) those with additional felony circumstances, and (2)
those with no additional felony circumstances. In both groups, those
with White victims were more likely than those with Black victims to be
sentenced to death. Among the homicides with additional felony
circumstances present, they found that 13.6% of those suspected of
killing Whites were sentenced to death, compared to 4.3% of those
suspected of killing Blacks."
The third study to examine the relationship between racial
characteristics and death sentencing in North Carolina in the modern
era was written by two professors at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill: political scientist Isaac Unah and John Boger, Dean of the
University of North Carolina School of Law." They gathered data on
3,990 homicides" with identified perpetrators that occurred in eighty of
North Carolina's 100 counties between January 1, 1993 and December
31, 1997." Death sentences were handed down in ninety-nine of the
cases." When all the explanatory variables were entered into one
predictive model, the researchers found that for similar homicides, the
odds of a death sentence for defendants, regardless of their race,
convicted of killing Whites were approximately 3.5 times higher than
the odds of a death sentence for those convicted of killing non-Whites.90
E. Hypotheses
All three post-Furman studies of death sentencing in North
Carolina found that the race of the victim, and not the race of the
defendant, was the principal non-legal factor associated with
contemporary death sentencing in the State. This finding is consistent
with post-Furman research on the application of the death penalty in
other states. In 1990, the United States General Accounting Office
("GAO") examined some twenty-eight studies that had studied issues
of race and arbitrariness in death sentencing in various American
83. Id. at 35-36, 233-34 (explaining the methods used for the death penalty analysis,
the North Carolina statute used, and the dates covered by the study).
84. Id. at 89.
85. Id.
86. UNAH & BOGER, supra note 15.
87. Id. at 18.
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id. at 18.
90. ISAAC UNAH & JACK BOGER, RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN NORTH
CAROLINA-AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: 1993-1997, at 4 (2001), available at
http://www.unc.edu/-jcboger/NCDeathPenaltyReport200l.pdf.
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jurisdictions since 1972.9' The GAO synthesis of the twenty-eight
studies revealed
a pattern of evidence indicating racial disparities in the
charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty after
the Furman decision. In 82 percent of the studies, race of victim
was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with
capital murder or receiving the death penalty .... This finding
was remarkably consistent across data sets, data collection
methods, and analytic techniques.9 2
The GAO found that the evidence for a race-of-defendant
impact was less clear, and hence the evidence supporting a
defendant's race effect "was equivocal."93
Since the GAO report was released in 1990, several other studies
from across the United States have continued to find significant race-
of-victim effects on death sentencing.94 The research in North
Carolina, however, badly needs updating. Two of the three studies
that examined this in North Carolina used data primarily from the
1970s,9' and the third, which has not yet been published, contained
data only through 1997.96 We thus designed a study to update the
existing North Carolina studies to see if any race effects continue to
exist, if they are consistent with what has been found in other states,
and, more specifically, to ascertain if the race of the victim is
associated with the current application of the death penalty in North
Carolina.
II. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
In this Part, we will describe the data that we obtained for this
study. We drew on two data sources on North Carolina homicides.
We used (1) Supplemental Homicide Reports from the FBI to obtain
91. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 1-2 (1990).
92. Id. at 5.
93. Id. at 6.
94. For an overview of the studies conducted prior to 2003, see David C. Baldus &
George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: An
Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39
CRIM. L. BULL. 194, 202-26 (2003) (looking at various empirical studies on the influence
of race discrimination in death penalty sentences conducted from 1973 to 2003).
95. GROSS & MAURO, supra note 15, at 234 (using data from mid-1977 through the
end of 1980); NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 15, at 93 (using data from mid-1977 through
mid-1978).
96. UNAH & BOGER, supra note 15, at 5 (using data from calendar years 1993 to
1997).
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data on homicide suspects in North Carolina, and (2) information on
the 368 defendants in North Carolina sentenced to death for
homicides that occurred between January 1, 1980 and December 31,
2007.
A. Supplemental Homicide Reports
To begin, we assembled a data set on all North Carolina
homicides with an identified perpetrator over a twenty-eight year
period from 1980 to 2007. We obtained these data from the FBI's
Supplemental Homicide Reports ("SHRs"). SHRs are compiled after
local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States report
homicide data to a central state agency, which in turn reports them to
the FBI in Washington for inclusion in its Uniform Crime Reports. 7
While the SHRs do not list the suspects' or victims' names, they do
include the following information: the month, year, and county of the
homicide; the age, gender, race, 98 and ethnicity of the suspects and
victims; the victim-suspect relationship, weapon used, and
information on whether the homicide was accompanied by additional
felonies (e.g., robbery or rape). 99 Local law enforcement agencies
usually report these data long before the defendant has been
convicted, so offender data are for "suspects," not convicted
offenders."oo
97. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
HANDBOOK 104-07 (2004), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/additional-ucr-
publications/ucr_handbook.pdf [hereinafter UCR HANDBOOK]. We have used SHR data
in other research projects, and an earlier version of this paragraph was included in an
article on a related subject. See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of
Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-99, 46
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 15 (2005).
98. See UCR HANDBOOK, supra note 97, at 97, 105-06. The racial designations used
in the UCR are defined as follows:
[1] White. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, North
Africa, or the Middle East. [2] Black. A person having origins in any of the black
racial groups of Africa. [3] American Indian or Alaskan Native. A person having
origins in any of the original peoples of North America and who maintains cultural
identification through tribal affiliation or community recognition. [43 Asian or
Pacific Islander. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far
East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the Pacific Islands. This area
includes, for example, China, India, Japan, Korea, the Philippine Islands, and
Samoa.
Id. at 97. There is also a category for "Unknown" race. Id. at 106.
99. See id. at 106-07.
100. Id. at 104-07.
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The SHRs include information on all murders and non-negligent
manslaughters, but they do not differentiate between the two types of
homicides. They define murders and non-negligent manslaughters as
"the willful (non-negligent) killing of one human being by another.
Deaths caused by negligence, attempts to kill, assaults to kill, suicides,
and accidental deaths are excluded."'01
In addition, the SHRs have a separate classification for justifiable
homicides, which are defined as "the killing of a felon by a law
enforcement officer in the line of duty; or the killing of a felon, during
the commission of a felony, by a private citizen."' 02 Because the data
come from police agencies, not all the identified suspects were
eventually convicted of the homicide.
For our project, a total of 15,281 homicide suspects were identified
from North Carolina SHRs for homicides committed during the period
1980 through 2007. Only those SHR cases that recorded the gender of
the homicide suspect were included in the sample, effectively
eliminating those cases in which no suspect was identified. In other
words, for SHR homicide cases where no suspect gender information
was recorded, we assumed that the police had not been able to identify
a suspect for that particular homicide incident, rendering sentencing
decisions irrelevant. In addition, in most of the analyses presented
herein, we eliminated 532 homicide suspect cases where the victim's
race information was either mixed (i.e., multiple murder with victims of
different races), or some race category other than White or Black. In
the end, our sample consisted of 15,281 homicide suspects, of which
14,749 were individuals suspected of homicides in which the victim or
victims were either Black or White. We used the complete data set only
for analyses that do not examine the race of the victim.
In addition to the race of the victim, the SHR data include
information on the number of homicide victims in each case and what
additional felonies, if any, occurred at the same time as the homicide.
These variables are key to the analysis reported below.
B. Death RowData Set
The Death Row Data Set was constructed with information from
368 cases in which defendants in North Carolina were sentenced to
death for homicides that occurred between January 1, 1980 and
December 31, 2007. We eliminated 16 cases in which the race of the
101. See UCR Offense Definitions, U.S. Dep't of Justice, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov
/offenses.cfm (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
102. UCR HANDBOOK, supra note 97, at 152.
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victim was neither White nor Black, leaving 352 cases for analysis.
Cases were identified from a master list of all North Carolina death
row inmates maintained by the North Carolina Department of
Correction ("DOC"), o3 as well as from a list of individuals who at one
time had been sentenced to death but who are no longer on death
row.104
Once the master list of death penalty cases was assembled, an
attorney working with the research team read direct appeal decisions by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina in all the cases. For each case, she
identified the defendant's and victim's race and sex, date and county of
offense, county of conviction, number of victims, and information on
accompanying felonies from both the DOC data and the direct appeal
decisions. The latter two variables are included in both the SHR data
and in the Death Row Data Set, enabling us to compare frequencies by
race of victim for both (1) all homicides and (2) all homicides that
resulted in a death sentence.
To conduct our analyses, we merged the Death Row Data Set
with the FBI/SHR homicide suspect data set. Cases were matched
based on the victim's race (White only and Black only victim
homicides), year of offense categorized into two periods (1980 to 1989
and 1990 to 2007),10 and Additional Legally Relevant Factors (no
Additional Factors, one Additional Factor, or two Additional
Factors). We define an Additional Legally Relevant Factor
("Additional Factors") as either (1) multiple victim homicide, or (2) a
homicide with accompanying felony circumstances.'06 In other words,
we used two characteristics of the homicide event to measure
Additional Factors: whether the homicide event took the lives of two
or more victims, and whether there was evidence of additional
103. Offenders on Death Row, supra note 36.
104. Persons Removed from Death Row, supra note 39.
105. We chose 1990 as a temporal breaking point because of the significant change to
North Carolina's capital sentencing that resulted from the Supreme Court's decision in
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990). McKoy held that capital jurors did not
have to be unanimous in finding the presence of mitigating circumstances argued by the
defense in death penalty cases. Id. at 435. After that decision, "the number of mitigating
circumstances presented to and accepted by capital juries in North Carolina doubled .... "
Janine Kremling et al., The Role of Mitigating Factors in Capital Sentencing Before and
AfierMcKoy v. North Carolina, 24 JUST. Q. 357, 358 (2007).
106. This is similar to the methodology used in other studies we have conducted using
information from the Supplemental Homicide Reports. See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L.
Radelet, Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge Parish, 1990-2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647,
666-70 (2011); Pierce & Radelet, supra note 97, at 20-24, 45-47; Michael L. Radelet &
Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who WilDie: Race and the Death Penalty in Florida, 43
FLA. L. REV. 1, 21-25 (1991). This methodology was developed and first used in GROSS &
MAURO, supra note 15, at 35-42.
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felonies (e.g., rape, robbery) that occurred at the same time as the
homicide."o' As will be discussed below, both of these factors are
relevant when distinguishing death penalty cases from other
homicides. We were able to match all 352 cases from the Death Row
Data Set in which the victims were "White only" or "Black only" with
the 14,749 homicide suspects in the SHR data set that had also had
"White only" or "Black only" victims.108
III. FINDINGS
A. Cross-Tabulations
Table A-3(a) presents an important finding: over the twenty-
eight years studied in North Carolina, those who are suspected of
killing Whites are over three times more likely to be sentenced to
death than those who are suspected of killing Blacks. Overall, 1.2% of
those suspected of killing Blacks are sentenced to death, compared to
3.9% of those suspected of killing Whites, for a ratio of 3.25. This
disparity is statistically significant, with a p-value of less than 0.001.'"
This disparity needs further investigation.
There is, however, more to the story. Table A-3(b) shows that in
a given homicide, White suspects are more likely to be sentenced to
death than Black suspects."0 The primary reason why White suspects
are more likely to be sentenced to death than Black suspects (among
107. As shown in Table A-4, this results in 12,290 cases with zero Additional Factors,
2,844 with one Additional Factor, and only 147 with two Additional Factors. See infra
Table A-4. Adding a third factor here would leave too few cases for meaningful analysis.
108. Other researchers who have used this matching method note that "[o]ften more
than one SHR case would correspond to a given death row case; however, since this
matching was done only for the purpose of analyzing data on variables that were reported
in both sources, it did not matter whether a particular death row case was identified with a
unique SHR case." GROSS & MAURO, supra note 15, at 38-39.
109. See infra Table A-3(a). Using the chi-square test, the data in Table A-3(a) form a
statistically significant relationship. is a test to determine if two variables (e.g., race and
death sentencing) are independent, or if there is an association between the two. The
observed results are compared to what would be expected if the two variables are indeed
independent. Traditionally, relationships are said to be statistically significant if the
chances that the observed results would come from a population in which the variables are
indeed independent are less than or equal to 5%. In Table A-3(a), the probability that
these patterns would be obtained if death sentencing is, in reality, unrelated to the race of
the victim is less than one out of 1,000. A p-value of .001 is the probability that the chi-
squared statistic would take a value at least as large as observed if the variables were
actually independent. See infra Table A-3(a).
110. However, as we will show in Table A-10(b), the effect of the race of the suspect
disappears when we statistically control for other variables. See infra Table A-10(b).
Because of that, Tables A-6, A-8, and A-9 will focus only on the race of the victim. See
infra Table A-6, Table A-8, and Table A-9.
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all homicides) is that homicides are primarily an intra-racial crime
(i.e., Whites tend to kill Whites and Blacks tend to kill Blacks). Since
the death penalty is more likely in cases where Whites are killed, this
increases the likelihood of White suspects being sentenced to death.
Table A-3(c) examines the probability of a death sentence controlling
for both the race of the suspect and the race of the victim. For White
victims, Black suspects are twice as likely to receive a death sentence
as White suspects. For Black victims this effect is reversed, although
the number of White-on-Black cases is relatively small and thus the
overall contribution to the effect of victim's race on death sentencing
decisions is also small. The race of the victim effect is largest for
Black suspects suspected of killing White victims, who are five times
more likely to be sentenced to death than Black suspects with Black
victims.
Table A-4 shows that our measures of Additional Factors are
excellent predictors of who is sentenced to death. Overall, only 1% of
the cases in which there are no Additional Factors end with a death
sentence, compared to 7.1% of those with one Additional Factor
present and 32% of those with two. If homicides with White victims
have more Additional Factors present than homicides with Black
victims, then the relationship observed in Table A-3(c) between
victim's race and death sentencing would be explained by legally
relevant factors.
Table A-5 shows that in each of the time periods analyzed (1980
to 1989 and 1990 to 2007), the higher the number of Additional
Factors, the higher the probability of a death sentence. Regardless of
whether there are zero, one, or two Additional Factors, death
sentencing rates were higher in the 1980s than in the latter time
period."'
However, the data in Table A-6 show that the reason why the
probability of a death sentence is higher for those who are suspected
of killing Whites than for those who are suspected of killing Blacks is
not because the former cases tend to have more Additional Factors.
Regardless of whether there are zero, one, or two Additional Factors
present, cases with White victims are more likely to result in a death
sentence than are cases with Black victims. In cases with no
Additional Factors, those with White victims are 2.5 times more likely
to end with a death sentence than those with Black victims. In cases
111. This reduction may be in part attributable to McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S.
433 (1990). See supra note 105 (discussing the impact of McKoyon the administration of
the death penalty in North Carolina).
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where one Additional Factor is present, those with White victims are
three times more likely to result in a death sentence than homicides
with Black victims. In cases with two Additional Factors, the ratio is
2.07. Thus, the data show that the reason why White victim cases are
more likely than Black victim cases to result in a death sentence is not
because the former types of homicides are more likely to include
Additional Factors.
Table A-7 shows that the probability of a death sentence is
remarkably consistent across time periods. In the 1980s, before the
McKoydecision,1 l2 2.7% of all homicides resulted in a death sentence,
compared to 2.3% in the period from 1990 to 2007. This difference in
death sentencing rates between time periods is not statistically
significant. Similarly, Table A-8 shows that the probability of death
sentences by the race of the victim has changed little between the two
time periods. In the 1980s, those suspected of killing Whites were 3.3
times more likely to be sentenced to death than those suspected of
killing Blacks. Between 1990 and 2007, this ratio declined a bit to 3.0.
In each time period, these differences are statistically significant.
Finally, Table A-9 cross-classifies the probabilities of a death
sentence with the three major variables used in this study: victim's
race, number of Additional Factors, and time period (1980-89 and
1990-2007). In both time periods and for each number of Additional
Factors, the data show that those who are suspected of killing Whites
are more likely to be sentenced to death than those who are
suspected of killing Blacks."' All of these relationships are
statistically significant with the exception of cases from the 1980s
where there were two Additional Factors present. In that cell, cases
with White victims are still much more likely than those with Black
victims to end in a death sentence (66.7% as opposed to 44.4%), but
the small number of cases causes the difference to not attain statistical
significance.
112. See supra note 105.
113. This can be seen by simply subtracting the death sentencing rates for homicides
with Black victims from the death sentencing rates for homicides with White victims using
the data presented in Table A-9. See infra Table A-9. Where no Additional Factors are
present, the death sentencing rate for White Victims is 1.3% higher than for Black Victims
in the 1980s and 0.7% higher in the 1990-2007 data. Where one Additional Factor is
present, the death sentencing rate in the 1980s is 5.6% higher for White victims and 6.9%
higher in the later time period. Where two Additional Factors are present, the death
sentencing rate for White victims in the 1980s is 22.3% higher in the 1980s for White
victims, and 24.5% higher in the 1990-2007 data. See infra Table A-9.
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B. Multiple Regression Models
The remaining Tables presented in this Article use a statistical
technique called logistic regression."14 This technique is used to
predict a dependent variable that has two categories, such as whether
or not a death sentence is imposed.
Tables A-3(a) through Table A-9 show that four factors are
associated with who is sentenced to death for murders in North
Carolina: the race of the victim, race of the suspect, the presence of
additional felony circumstances, and the number of victims. Because
the data in Table A-7 do not show marked variation in death
sentencing rates between our two time periods, this variable was not
used, although we will present identical models for both time periods
so the patterns can be compared.
Tables A-10(a), A-10(b), and A-10(c) present the results of the
logistic regression analysis for the entire twenty-eight years of the
study."' The independent variables are suspect's and victim's races
114. In logistic regression, the dependent variable is predicted with a series of
independent variables, such as gender, income, etc. The model predicts the dependent
variable with a series of independent variables, and the unique predictive utility of each
independent variable can be ascertained. As we have explained elsewhere,
Logistic regression models estimate the average effect of each independent
variable (predictor) on the odds that a convicted felon would receive a sentence of
death. An odds ratio is simply the ratio of the probability of a death sentence to
the probability of a sentence other than death. Thus, when one's likelihood of
receiving a death sentence is .75 (P), then the probability of receiving a non-death
sentence is .25 (1-P). The odds ratio in this example is .75/.25 or 3 to 1. Simply put,
the odds of getting the death sentence in this case are 3 to 1. The dependent
variable is a natural logarithm of the odds ratio, y, of having received the death
penalty. Thus, y=P / 1-P and; (1) ln(y) = o.XA + Eiwhere to is an intercept, A are
the i coefficients for the i independent variables, X is the matrix of observations on
the independent variables, and i is the error term. Results for the logistic model
are reported as odds ratios. Recall that when interpreting odds ratios, an odds
ratio of one means that someone with that specific characteristic is just as likely to
receive a capital sentence as not. Odds ratios of greater than one indicate a higher
likelihood of the death penalty for those offenders who have a positive value for
that particular independent variable. When the independent variable is
continuous, the odds ratio indicates the increase in the odds of receiving the death
penalty for each unitary increase in the predictor.
Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in Illinois,
1988-1997, 81 OR. L. RE V. 39, 59 (2002).
115. Logistic regression is a statistical method to predict the value of one variable with
a series of other variables. The technique is regularly used in studies of race and death
sentencing. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH, & CHARLES A.
PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 78 n.55 (1990) (explaining how
logistic regression models can be used to calculate the odds of a death sentence); GROSS &
MAURO, supra note 15, at 248-52 (using a logistic regression model to help predict the
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(White or Black), and the number of Additional Factors (none, one
or two, where an Additional Legally Relevant Factor is either (1) a
multiple victim homicide (where the number of victims was coded as
one or two or more), or (2) a homicide with accompanying felony
circumstances.) For purposes of this analysis, Additional Factors were
measured by two separate variables: (1) one factor versus none, (2)
two factors versus none. The remaining comparison of one factor
versus two factors can be estimated by subtracting the two
corresponding model parameter estimates. The reference category for
these two variables is no Additional Factors.
Table A-10(a) shows that, as expected, the two Additional
Factors both exert significant ability in predicting who is sentenced to
death. Table A-10(b) adds the races of the suspect and the victim into
the equation. Here we see that the race of the victim is statistically
significant, but the race of the suspect is not. In other words, despite
the original finding displayed in Table A-3(b) that shows that the race
of the suspect is initially correlated with death sentencing, this effect
disappears when we statistically control for the other variables in the
analysis. The reason why White suspects are more likely to be
sentenced to death than Black suspects (among all homicides) is that
Whites tend to kill Whites and Blacks tend to kill Blacks, and the
death penalty is far more likely in cases where Whites are killed. In
the end, the race of the suspect is not statistically significant and does
not add anything to our understanding of who is sentenced to death.
Therefore, in Table A-10(c) we remove the suspect's race from
the equation. This procedure results in the model that best fits the
data presented in this Article. Comparing Tables A-10(a) and A-
10(c), we can see that even after the presence of our two Additional
Factors is used to explain all the variation in death sentencing that
they can (Table A-10(a)), adding the race of the victim to the
equation (Table A-10(c)) adds statistically significant additional
explanatory power."' The Exp (P) for the race of the victim in Table
A-10(c) reveals a strong effect. This shows that the odds of receiving
a death sentence for killing one or more White victims increase by a
factor of 2.96, controlling for the other independent variables in the
equation. Thus, 2.96 (the Exp (0) value for White victims) is the odds
probability of a death sentence); Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by Geography and
Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 MARGINS 1, 31-
44 (2004) (using logistic regression to address the relationship between victim and
offender race).
116. Adding the victim's race to the equation increases the overall model Chi-Square
by 87.765, which is statistically significant at less than .001.
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ratio for an offender who is suspected of killing a White victim being
sentenced to death. An odds ratio of exactly 1.0 means that the
likelihood of receiving a death sentence changed by a factor of 1, or
not at all."' Here, we see the main conclusion from this research: after
controlling for the legally relevant factors, in North Carolina from
1980 to 2007, the odds of receiving a death sentence in a White victim
homicide case were, on average, 2.96 times higher than the odds of
receiving a death sentence in a Black victim case.
Tables A-11(a) and A-11(b) repeat this analysis with only the
cases from the 1980s, and Tables A-12(a) and A-12(b) use only cases
from 1990 to 2007. For each time period, adding the variable
measuring race of the victim significantly increases the predictive
power of the model. For the 1980s, as shown in Table A-11(b), adding
the race of the victim to the predictive equation improves the model
chi-square by 19.873, which is a significant improvement. Here the
odds of a death sentence for those who kill Whites are 2.51 times
higher than the odds for cases with Black victims. For the years 1990
to 2007, as shown in Table A-12(b), the odds of a death sentence for
White victim cases are 3.02 higher than the odds of a death sentence
in Black victim cases. As one would hope and expect, the Additional
Factors are very strong predictors of who is sentenced to death, but
even after these factors are controlled, race still matters.
CONCLUSION
The data presented in this Article show that in the twenty-eight
year period from 1980 to 2007, the race of the victim in homicide
cases is a strong predictor of who is sentenced to death in North
Carolina. Even after statistically controlling for the level of
Additional Factors in the case, the victim's race remains a powerful
predictor of who is and who is not sentenced to death. Overall, for
homicides in North Carolina from 1980 to 2007, the odds of a death
sentence for those who are suspected of killing Whites are
approximately three times higher than the odds of a death sentence
for those suspected of killing Blacks. This odds ratio varies little if we
break the data into two time periods (1980 to 1989 and 1990 to 2007).
In short, the data support the conclusion that at least in the period
117. Courts generally recognize that an odds ratio, or relative risk, of greater than 2.0
shows the presence of a causal effect. See, e.g., Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079,
1087 (N.J. 1992) (discussing a lower court opinion that favorably cited a line of cases in
which an odds ratio of 2.0 was required to show the presence of a causal effect).
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from 1980 to 2007, the race of the victim is a significant factor in the
decision to seek and/or impose the death penalty."'
Of course, not every factor used by prosecutors in decisions to
seek the death penalty or jurors to impose death is included in this
study, although, as shown in Table A-4, the Additional Legally
Relevant Factors we measured are strong predictors of who is
sentenced to death. Still, it may be, for example, that the race effect
could be explained by such factors as the suspect's prior record of
criminality, the defendant-victim relationship (family versus
stranger), the amount of premeditation, or any number of other
legally relevant factors." 9 On the other hand, it is equally possible
that controlling for those factors could augment the race effects.
Those who remain convinced that the death penalty in North
Carolina is applied without racial bias should build on this study and
gather data that might reveal how other, non-measured factors might
increase or decrease the racial disparities that we have observed
herein.'20 In the end, defenders of the death penalty might assert that
because all homicide cases and defendants are different, grouping of
homicides into similar categories for statistical analysis is
impossible.' 2 ' Although we are limited in our abilities to control for
other factors in this study, other studies that have examined the
118. Despite differences in data sources and methodology, these results are consistent
with those reached in the other three research projects that have examined post-Furman
patterns of death sentencing in North Carolina. See GROSS & MAURO, supra note 15, at
91 ("In each state, [including North Carolina,] the overall odds that an offender would
receive the death penalty were much greater for killing a white victim than for killing a
black victim."); NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 15, at 159 ("[A] defendant charged with
murder of a white was six times more likely to be convicted than a defendant charged with
murdering a nonwhite."); UNAH & BOGER, supra note 15, at 20 ("[C]onsistent with racial
threat theory there is a stark difference in death-sentencing rates between white and
nonwhite victim cases.").
119. Future researchers in this area will also want to look into county-by-county
variations in death sentencing. See Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty
and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 8) (on file with
authors) ("Just 10% of counties in the country account for all death sentences imposed
between 2004-2009.").
120. For a review of these studies, see generally Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 94
(reviewing various empirical studies conducted from 1973 to 2003 on the influence of race
discrimination in death penalty sentencing).
121. That precise point was made in McCleskey v. Kemp, when Justice Powell wrote,
"[tihe capital sentencing decision requires the individual jurors to focus their collective
judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal defendant. It is not
surprising that such collective judgments often are difficult to explain." 481 U.S. 279, 311
(1987). These judgments, Justice Powell contended, "defy codification." Id. Of course,
when legislators specify what factors increase or decrease the appropriateness of the death
penalty for a given type of homicide, they are doing this same sort of categorizing.
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ability of additional variables to explain racial disparities in death
sentencing have failed to account for race-of-victim effects in death
sentencing. 122
More sophisticated studies, however, are neither easy nor
inexpensive. Unfortunately, the State of North Carolina collects little
data on homicide cases, so no data set that would allow the precise
identification of which homicide cases are and are not eligible for the
death penalty (and the attributes of those cases) exists. If such data
were available, researchers could determine which cases were eligible
for the death penalty, and, of those, which cases became a death
penalty prosecution, which of those ended in a plea bargain where the
death penalty was taken off the table, and which of those ended in a
jury verdict where the offender was sentenced to a prison term rather
than death.
A more comprehensive study of race and death sentencing in
North Carolina might also examine factors such as the races of the
prosecutors or trial judges involved in death penalty decisions.123 It is
possible, for example, that potential jurors who are Black are more
likely to be excluded from jury service than potential jurors who are
White.124 Much more also needs to be learned about plea bargaining.
For example, we have no information about which of our death
penalty cases involved a deal in which the defendant could have
avoided the death penalty through a guilty plea. Are such pleas more
likely to be offered by White prosecutors in cases in which the murder
victim is Black? 2 5
In the end, the data reported in this Article reveal strong racial
disparities in death sentencing in North Carolina. However, the data
do not tell us if the racial bias is intentional or unintentional,
122. See, e.g., Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 94, at 212 (discussing a study in which
the variables used to explain racial disparities in capital sentencing included prosecutorial
striking of black members from the potential jury pool).
123. We know of no major studies that have examined these variables.
124. One recent study has found such a pattern. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 5-6 (2010),
available athttp://eji.org/eji/files/62510% 20Edited% 20Tutwiler% 20version% 20Final
% 20Report% 20from% 20printer% 20online.pdf.
125. We know of no research that has examined if the race of the prosecutor affects
death penalty decisions. Measuring whether or not a plea bargain is offered is not as easy
as it may sound. Some defense attorneys may vigorously pursue a deal, whereas others
may not. The latter may result from a defendant's dogged desire not to plea ("I would
rather be executed than be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole"), or a
defendant's unwavering insistence on innocence.
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conscious or unconscious.126 Teachers, for example, might treat their
male and female students differently without even being aware of it.127
While it is possible that the data reflect intentional or overt
discrimination by prosecutors, judges, and/or jurors, the racial
disparities revealed in this research project may exist without the
actors in the system being aware of it.
Two decades ago, when confronted with similar statistical data
showing racial biases in death sentencing in Georgia, Supreme Court
Justice William Brennan made the following observation:
Warren McCleskey's evidence confronts us with the subtle and
persistent influence of the past. His message is a disturbing one
to a society that has formally repudiated racism, and a
frustrating one to a Nation accustomed to regarding its destiny
as the product of its own will. Nonetheless, we ignore him at
our peril, for we remain imprisoned by the past as long as we
deny its influence in the present.... [T]he way in which we
chose those who will die reveals the depth of moral
commitment among the living.'28
The data presented in this Article show that Justice Brennan's
words remain an important challenge to those who aspire to construct
a criminal justice system that is indeed color blind.'29
126. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 1016, 1016-17 (1988) (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v.
Kemp for neglecting the possibility that "unconscious racism" infects judicial decisions).
127. Myra Sadker & David M. Sadker, Sexism in the Schoolroom of the '80s, 19
PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar. 1985, at 54, 54-57 (reporting results of research showing boys in
grade-school classrooms received more attention and praise than girls from teachers
notwithstanding teachers' assertions to the contrary).
128. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). On a 5-4
vote, the decision took the position that statistical evidence of racial disparities in the
application of the death penalty was insufficient to challenge death sentences under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 313. The decision was written by Justice
Powell, who was then serving his last year on the Court. Id. at 282. Four years later,
Powell's biographer asked the retired justice if he wished he could change his vote in any
single case. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451 (1994). "Yes,"
Powell replied. "McCleskey v. Kemp." Id. Powell, who dissented in Furman and in his
tenure on the Court remained among the justices who regularly voted to sustain death
sentences, had changed his mind. Id. "I have come to think that capital punishment should
be abolished . . . [because it] serves no useful purpose." Id. at 451-52. Had Powell had this
realization a few years earlier, it is quite likely that the death penalty would have been, at
least temporarily, abolished.
129. The opportunity to explore the role of race in capital sentencing presented by
North Carolina's Racial Justice Act may be a limited one. Legislators in North Carolina
have introduced legislation that would repeal the new protections of the Racial Justice Act
if passed. No Discriminatory Purpose in Death Penalty, H.B. 615, 2011 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (proposing to amend the Racial Justice Act to require death row
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APPENDIX
Table A-1: Homicides by Victim Race'30
2000 4ou 102000 (0.422) .541 (0
245 274 18
(0.453) (0.506) (0.
~Q4 4) 5Q M.
221 255 17
2004 in AIM rn W7 in)
13in v 4 563 559
I rn 1 9 1512 1503 1
2006 5'
(0.403) (0.5581 (0.030) (0.0091
2008 269 29 I 01ir 13 602 58
Total ZiI/ -Z5 1 oi 5,446 5,363
T (0.432) 1 (0.529) 1 (0.026) (0.012) 8 5 5
inmates to demonstrate a discriminatory purpose in capital sentencing without being able
to rely on statistical evidence of racial discrimination). For additional coverage of this
proposal, see Anna Stolley Persky, Numbers Tell the Tale: North Carolina ' Death Row
Inmates Let Statistics Back Up Bias Claims, A.B.A. J., May 2011, at 18, 19 (stating that
some legislators are planning to attempt to repeal or significantly narrow the Racial
Justice Act); Erin Zureick, Bill Would Gut Death-Row Inmates' Access to Racial-Bias
Claim, STARNEWS ONLINE (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.starnewsonline.com/article
/20110407/ARTICLES/110409699/-1/sports01?p=1&tc=pg (describing proposals to repeal
the Racial Justice Act).
130. See 2009 Annual Summary Report, 2009 Crime Statistics in Detailed Reports,
Murder, Murder Victims by Race, Ten Year Trend, N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://crimereporting.ncdoj.gov/ (click "View Crime Statistics" hyperlink; then click
"Submit" next to year 2009; then follow "Murder" hyperlink under "Index Offenses -
Analysis" subheading; then follow "Murder Victims by Race, Ten Year Trend" hyperlink)
(last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
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Table A -2: Homicides by Offender Race1 31
2000 1 ' 0 1 13/A1~A 12 i
208 308
(0.394) (0.51
2004 182 304(0.363) (0.6(
2 10 243 37
















Total 1,961 1 3,417 93 38 1445 6,954 5,509
Total (0.356) 1 (0.620) (0.017) (0.007) 6 5,0
131. See 2009 Annual Summary Report, 2009 Crime Statistics in Detailed Reports,
Murder, Murder Offenders by Race, Ten Year Trend, N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://crimereporting.ncdoj.gov/ (click "View Crime Statistics" hyperlink; then click
"Submit" next to year 2009; then follow "Murder" hyperlink under "Index Offenses -
Analysis" subheading; then follow "Murder Offenders by Race, Ten Year Trend"
hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 22, 2011). We have been unable to find data on homicides in
North Carolina for the years prior to 1999 by race of offender or victim. Annual numbers
of homicides, 1978-1999, are: 1978: 594; 1979: 590; 1980: 608; 1981: 531; 1982: 538; 1983:
480; 1984: 459; 1985: 504; 1986: 510; 1987: 514; 1988: 511; 1989: 615; 1990: 691; 1991: 773;
1992: 710; 1993: 793; 1994: 759; 1995: 673; 1996: 621; 1997: 608; 1998: 607; 1999: 536. See
N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA-1999, 2 (2000),
http://crimereporting.ncdoj.gov/public/1999/Publications/sumrpt99.pdf (providing murder
data for 1998 and 1999); N.C. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NORTH CAROLINA INDEX CRIME
TRENDS: 1978-1997 (1997), http://crimereporting.ncdoj.gov/public/1997/78-97trd.pdf
(providing murder data from 1978 to 1997).
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Table A -3(b): Race of Suspect with Death Sentencing, 1980-2007
(n = 14,709)133





132. There were 532 cases excluded from this analysis. This is because the race of the
victim was of a race other than Black or White, mixed race, or race was unknown.
133. There were 572 cases excluded from this analysis. This is because the race of the
suspect was of a race other than Black or White, mixed race, or race was unknown.
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1,318 (0.939) I 4,713 (0.971)
4,854
Table A -4: Number ofA dditional Legally Relevant Factors and
Death Sentencing (n = 15,281)
I No 1 12,171 (0.990) 12,642 (0.929) 1 100 (0.680)






134. This Table excludes 780 cases excluded from this analysis. This is because the race
of the victim or suspect was of a race other than Black or White, mixed race, or race was
unknown.
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Table A-5: Death Sentences by Number ofAdditional Legally
Relevant Factors by Year (n = 15,281)
4110 (0.989) 634(0.894) 9(0.474)
989
N 4,156 709 19
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Table A-6: Death Sentences by Victim's Race by Number ofAdditional
L egally Relevant Factors, 1980-2007 (n = 14,749)
0 ~ No J 6,843 (0.994) 4,925 (0.985)
Chi-Square = 25.38;
p <0.001 N 6,884 5,001
Chi-Square 53.42; Yes 49 (0.035) 143 (0.106)
p < 0.001 N 344
2 No 48 (0.774) 
33 (0.532)
Chi-Square 8.01; s 4(.2 ) 29<OAM)
p = 0.005 N 62 6
Table A -7:Death Sentencing by Year (n 15,281)
No 4,753 (0.973) 10,160 (0.977)
1 4,884In 10,397o
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Table A -8: Victin's Race byDeath Sentencing by Year (n = 14,749)
19801989No 2,527 (0.987) 2,093 (0.957)
Chi-Square 41.9;
p <n0.001 2,560 2188
1990-2007
Chi-Square 64.08 Yes 71(0.012) 153 (0.036)
p < 0.
0 0 1
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TableA-9Death Sentences by Victim's Race by Number ofAdditional
LegallyRelevantFactors by Year (n = 14,749)
I Victirr"; RaIce
L eol Lev n I a F _o r RhI k AWh ite
No 2,304 (0.994) 1,687 (0.981)
0






Chi-Square 0.900; p <0.343
n 9 9
1990-
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Table A -10(a): Logistic Regression Analysis of Victim's Race and
Number ofAdditional L egally Relevant Factors on the Imposition ofa
Death Sentence, 1980-2007 (n = 14,749) *
1 Additional Factor** 2.025 < 0.001 7.58
Constant I -4.611 < 0.001 0.010
Table A -10(b): Logistic Regression Analysis ofSuspect and
Victim 's Race and Number ofA dditional Legally Relevant Factors on
the Imposition ofa Death Sentence, 1980-2007 (n = 14,501) *
Suspect Race** 0.172 0.236 1.187
1 Additional Factor*** 2.020 I 0.001
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Table A-10(c): Logistic Regression Analysis of Victim's Race and
Number ofA dditional Legally Relevant Factors on the Imposition ofa
Death Sentence, 1980-2007(n = 14,749)*
Victim Race** 1.086 I< 0.001 12.96
2 Additional Factors*** 3.988 < 0.001 53.946
Dueatn sentence is coacia: u =no aeatn sentence vn = 1I); I aeain sentence
(n = 352)
** 0 Black; I = White.
***0 Not present; 1 = present
-2 Log Likelihood = 2,777.40; Chi-Square = 547.781; df = 3, p < 0.001.
Model improvement Chi-Square from Table 10(a) = 87.765; df = 1; p = < 0.001
Table A -11(a): Logistic Regression Analysis of Victim 's Race and
Number ofA dditional Legally Relevant Factors on the Imposition ofa
Death Sentence, 1980-1989 (n = 4, 748) *
1 Additional Factor** 2.344 <0.001 10.43
C -4.485 < 0.001
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Table A -11(b): Logistic Regression Analysis of Victim 's Race and
Number ofA dditional Legally Relevant Factors on the Imposition of a
Death Sentence, 1980-1989 (n = 4,748) *
Victim Race** 0.919 < 0.001 2.51
2 Additional Factors*** 4.754 < 0.001 116.08
*Death Sentence is coded: 0 = no death sentence (n = 4,620); 1 = death sentence
(n = 128)
** 0 Black; 1 = White.
***0 Not present; 1 = present
-2 Log Likelihood = 965.86; Chi-Square = 211.705; df = 2, p <0.001.
Model improvement Chi-Square = 19.873; df = 1, p = < 0.001
Table A -12(a): Logistic Regression Analysis of Victim's Race and
Number ofA dditional Legally Relevant Factors on the Imposition ofa
Death Sentence, 1990-2007(n = 10,001) *
1 Additional Factor** 1.898 I 0.001 6.67
C -4.682 < 0.001
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Table A -12(b): Logistic Regression Analysis of Victhn 's Race and
Number ofA dditional LegallyRelevant Factors on the Imposition ofa
Death Sentence, 1990-2007(n = 10,001)*
Victim Race** 1.106 <0.001 3.02
2 Additional Factors*** 3.887 < 0.001
*Death Sentence is coded: 0 = no death sentence (n = 9,777); 1 = deatt
(n = 224)
** 0 = Black; 1 = White.
***0= Not present; 1 = present
-2 Log Likelihood = 1798.705; Chi-Square = 346.100; df = 3, p <0.001.
Model improvement Chi-Square = 59.613; df = 1; p = < 0.001
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